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1Department of Community and Family Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2Department of Medicine and Therapeutics, Prince of Wales
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Background. We report the temporal-spatial spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) among
inpatients in a hospital ward during a major nosocomial outbreak and discuss possible mechanisms for the outbreak.
Methods. All inpatients who had stayed in the same ward as the initial index case patient for any duration
before isolation were recruited into a cohort and followed up to document the occurrence of SARS. The normalized
concentration of virus-laden aerosols at different locations of the ward was estimated by use of computational
fluid dynamics modeling. The attack rates in the various subgroups stratified by bed location were calculated.
Multivariate Cox proportional hazards regression was used to document important risk factors.
Results. The overall attack rate of SARS was 41% (30 of 74 subjects). It was 65%, 52%, and 18% in the same
bay, adjacent bay, and distant bays, respectively ( ). Computation fluid dynamics modeling indicated thatPp .001
the normalized concentration of virus-laden aerosols was highest in the same bay and lowest in the distant bays.
Cox regression indicated that staying in the ward on 6 or 10 March entailed higher risk, as well as staying in the
same or adjacent bays. The epidemic curve showed 2 peaks, and stratified analyses by bed location suggested 11
generation of spread.
Conclusions. The temporal-spatial spread of SARS in the ward was consistent with airborne transmission, as
modeled by use of computational fluid dynamics. Infected health care workers likely acted as secondary sources
in the latter phase of the outbreak.
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), which orig-
inated from the Guangdong Province of China, was
first recognized in February 2003 [1]. A medical doctor
from Guangzhou (Canton), who stayed in a Hong Kong
hotel in February 2003, was identified as the index case
patient for the international spread of SARS to at least
5 countries [2]. A young Hong Kong resident visited
the hotel and contracted the disease, subsequently lead-
ing to a big outbreak in the Prince of Wales Hospital,
where he was treated.
Hong Kong was one of the places hardest hit by
SARS, with a total of 1755 cases and a death toll of
299. In the initial phase of the outbreak in the Prince
of Wales Hospital alone, 1100 persons were affected,
including doctors, nurses, medical students, other hos-
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pital patients, visitors, and their relatives [3]. A gov-
ernment investigation reported that 1 of the patients
with SARS subsequently spread the disease to 1300 res-
idents in a private housing estate (Amoy Gardens) [4].
It is generally believed that SARS is primarily trans-
mitted by droplets or direct contacts [5]; however,
probable airborne transmission during the Amoy Gar-
dens outbreak has been reported by us [6].
A detailed epidemiological study of the outbreak in
the Prince of Wales Hospital may shed light on the
possible modes of transmission and help in the pre-
vention of nosocomial spread in the future. Four groups
of subjects could be identified in this outbreak: the
health care workers (HCWs), including doctors and
nurses, the medical students who were attending clinical
teaching or examinations in the ward, other inpatients
staying in the same ward, and visitors. The spread of
SARS among the medical students and HCWs has been
reported elsewhere [7, 8]. Here, we report the temporal-
spatial spread of SARS to other inpatients staying in
the same ward and explore the possible factors and
mechanisms involved in the nosocomial outbreak.
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Figure 1. Layout of the ward where the index case patient with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was hospitalized, showing the location
of beds, air supply diffusers, and exhaust grilles. Supply and exhaust flow rates were measured in liters per second). The index case patient stayed
in bed 11 during the period 4–12 March. Same bay, beds 9–16, 9x, and 16x; adjacent bay, beds 17–24, 17x, and 24x; distant bays, all other beds.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
A retrospective cohort study was conducted. The index case pa-
tient was first admitted into the male medical ward on 4 March
2003 and was put under isolation on 12 March. All inpatients
who had stayed in the same ward as the index case patient for
any duration during the period 4–12 March were recruited into
the cohort. Baseline information for each subject was obtained
from the computerized medical record system and included age,
date of admission, bed number, comorbidity, drug treatment,
and date of leaving the ward (discharge or transfer). All subjects
were observed until the end of March 2003 (at least 22 days) to
observe whether they developed SARS. SARS was diagnosed on
the basis of the interim case definition at the time [9], and all
cases were subsequently confirmed serologically by immunofluo-
rescence assay [10] showing rising titer of IgG to the SARS-
associated coronavirus. The dates of onset of fever for all patients
with SARS were recorded.
The attack rates of SARS among all inpatients and in the
subgroups were calculated. The relationships between SARS and
bed location, date of exposure, duration of exposure, smoking
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Figure 2. Date of fever onset for all patients with severe acute
respiratory syndrome in the ward, stratified by bed location.
Table 1. Attack rates of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) for inpatients according to the dates of presence in the




No. (%) of subjects
with SARS Pa
4 March 2003
Present 36 15 (41.7) 1.000
Absent 38 15 (39.5)
5 March 2003
Present 43 18 (41.9) .974
Absent 31 12 (38.7)
6 March 2003
Present 41 23 (56.1) .005
Absent 33 7 (21.2)
7 March 2003
Present 39 20 (51.3) .080
Absent 35 10 (28.6)
8 March 2003
Present 35 17 (48.6) .273
Absent 39 13 (33.3)
9 March 2003
Present 37 18 (48.6) .236
Absent 37 12 (32.4)
10 March 2003
Present 32 17 (53.1) .092
Absent 42 13 (31.0)
11 March 2003
Present 26 14 (53.8) .142
Absent 48 16 (33.3)
12 March 2003
Present 22 13 (59.1) .064
Absent 52 17 (32.7)
NOTE. Absent, not present in the ward that day; present; present in the
ward that day.
a Determined by x2 test.
habit, preexisting medical illness, drug treatments, and age were
first examined by univariate analyses with x2 tests and Student’s
t test. Beds were divided into 3 groups according to their prox-
imity to the bed of the index case patient: same bay, adjacent
bay, and distant bays (figure 1). Multivariate analysis with Cox
proportional hazards regression was used to identify important
risk factors. Variables were entered by use of a forward stepwise
strategy: location, presence in the ward on specific dates, age
(continuous variable), smoking habit, steroid and antiviral treat-
ments, and various chronic diseases. All statistical analyses were
done with SPSS for Windows, version 11.0.1 (SPSS).
To explore the possible roles of HCWs in the outbreak of
infection, all nurses working on the ward during the study period
were interviewed in person between 28 March and 8 April with
a questionnaire to collect information on symptoms, contacts,
and working practices.
Information about the ventilation system of the ward was
collected, including the location and size of supply diffusers and
exhaust grilles, supply air temperature, and the air-flow rate
through each supply diffuser, exhaust grille, and exhaust fan.
Dispersion of the hypothetical virus-laden aerosols, which orig-
inated from the index case patient’s bed, through the entire ward
was analyzed by computational fluid dynamics (CFD) method.
CFD allows prediction of detailed 3-dimensional air-flow pattern
as well as pollutant dispersion in the ward. The industry-standard
CFD package Fluent [11] was used. The computational domain
included the ward and the entrance.
RESULTS
All 74 subjects who ever stayed in the ward during the study
period were included into the cohort. Thirty-six subjects had
their first exposures on 4 March, when the index case was
admitted, and 38 new admissions took place during 5–9 March.
All subjects were men, with a mean age of 66 years (range, 19–
90 years); patients with SARS were slightly older than those
without SARS (mean, 69 vs. 65 years; , by Student’s tP 1 .05
test). Sixteen (22%) were current smokers, and 25 (34%) were
ex-smokers.
Thirty subjects developed SARS during the follow-up period,
giving an overall attack rate of 40.5%. Twenty-three subjects
died during the follow-up period (14 died of SARS, and the
other 9 died of other unrelated causes).
Two peaks were present in the overall epidemic curve—11
March and 15 March (figure 2). Patients who stayed in the
distant bays had, in general, a later onset of fever.
Spatial distribution of cases. Thirteen (65.0%) of the 20
subjects in the same bay developed SARS. The attack rate was
52.4% (11 of 21 subjects) in the adjacent bay and 18.2% (6 of
33) in the distant bays. The proportions infected in the 3 lo-
cations differed significantly ( ; ).2x p 13.03 Pp .001
Effects of exposure dates and duration. The date of pres-
ence in the ward was associated with SARS (table 1). Those
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Table 2. Risk factors for severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) among inpatients in the hospital ward during the outbreak
in March 2003 identified by Cox regression.
Significant risk factor Hazard ratio (95% CI) P
Location
Distant bays 1.00
Adjacent bay 3.94 (1.45–10.69) .007
Same bay 4.35 (1.63–11.61) .003
Present in ward on 6 March 2003 4.49 (1.87–10.78) .001
Present in ward on 10 March 2003 2.44 (1.14–5.19) .021
NOTE. The forward stepwise strategy was adopted in the regression
models with the following covariates: age, smoking habit, steroid and antiviral
treatments, and various chronic diseases.
Figure 3. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)–free survival
curves for inpatients in the 3 bed locations in the ward.
who were not present in the ward on 6 March had a significantly
lower attack rate (7 [21.2%] of 33 subjects) than did those who
were present (23 [56.1%] of 41; ). The duration ofPp .005
stay did not have any influence on SARS.
Preexisting medical diseases and treatment. All subjects had
1 chronic disease, including cardiovascular disease (61% of
subjects), pulmonary disease (41%), liver disease (22%), diabetes
mellitus (19%), blood disease (19%), and renal disease (12%).
Preexisting chronic diseases were not associated with SARS. Fif-
teen subjects were taking steroids for other diseases, and they
had a slightly lower attack rate (33.3%), but the difference was
statistically insignificant. Stratified analysis by location did not
support any protective effects. Of the 3 subjects receiving antiviral
treatment for viral hepatitis (2 receiving lamivudine and 1 re-
ceiving oseltamivir), 2 subsequently developed SARS.
Multivariate analysis. The results of the Cox regression
model are given in table 2. Presence in the ward on either 6
or 10 March was associated with a significantly higher risk of
SARS. Subjects in the same bay or adjacent bay also had sig-
nificantly higher risks. Age, smoking, preexisting diseases, and
drugs received were not significant. The SARS-free survival
curves in the 3 locations are shown in figure 3. The log rank
test result was highly statistically significant ( ).P ! .001
Survey among nurses. All but 1 of the 15 nurses were
infected with the agent of SARS. The fever onset dates are given
in figure 4A. All reported having direct contacts with the index
case patient except the ward manager, who also developed SARS
during this outbreak. Most subject reported washing their
hands after caring for the index case patient.
Spatial distribution of the hypothetical virus-laden aerosols.
The airflow pattern in the ward was very unsteady because of
the interactions of various thermal buoyancy and momentum
forces as well as movements of people. The ward was air-con-
ditioned by a fan coil system with a separate fresh air supply.
The exhaust air from this ward was discharged to the outside
and not recirculated to other wards. A steady-state normalized
concentration contour of virus-laden aerosols at a height of 1.1
m above ground is shown in figure 5. The concentration was
between 0.015 and 1 in the same bay, between 0.005 and 0.008
in the adjacent bay, and between 0.0015 and 0.005 in the distant
bays.
DISCUSSION
In this analysis of inpatients in the medical ward with the largest
nosocomial outbreak during the SARS epidemic in 2003, we
included all eligible subjects into the cohort, and there was no
selection bias. The data used for analysis were collected at the
time of occurrence and did not depend on any recall and, thus,
should be objective and unbiased. This cohort of subjects pro-
vided a good opportunity to explore the risk factors associated
with nosocomial infections with the SARS agent.
The attack rate was very high, with 41% of subjects infected
within a period of 8–9 days. The risk of infection was signif-
icantly associated with the bed location and the dates of pres-
ence on the ward. The duration of exposure and personal fac-
tors were not significant predictors of SARS in this cohort.
The spatial distribution of the infected inpatients was not
random. The probability of such a distribution occurring by
chance was only 1 in 1000. The division of bed location, based
on proximity to the index case, into high-exposure (same bay),
middle-exposure (adjacent bay), and low-exposure (distant
bays) areas corresponded well with the normalized concentra-
tions of the virus-laden aerosols predicted by CFD modeling.
The attack rate was highest in the same bay (65%), slightly
lower in the adjacent bay (52%), and much lower in the distant
bays (18%), suggesting the possibility of a nonlinear relation-
ship between concentration of virus and risk of infection. The
SARS-free survival curves also indicated clearly that those stay-
ing in the distant bays were at lower risk. The relationship
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Figure 4. Dates of fever onset for nurses (A), all health care and supporting workers (B), visitors (C), and all patients combined (D) involved in
the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome.
between proximity to the index case patient and risk of infec-
tion suggested that airborne transmission probably played an
important role in this nosocomial outbreak.
Were there any alternative explanations for the particular
pattern of distribution? Clustering of susceptible subjects in
certain bays could theoretically lead to different attack rates.
However, no particular high-risk personal characteristics or
comorbidities have been identified thus far. Movements of the
index case patient around the ward could have spread the in-
fection to the other bays through direct contacts or droplets,
but he was very ill during his first week of hospitalization and
was bed-bound in the same bed [8]. Some inpatients in the
ward were ambulatory, but it was most unlikely that many
inpatients visited the index case patient and contracted the
disease directly from him. They could also have acquired the
infection in common areas that had been contaminated, such
as the toilets, but because inpatients in the different bays were
not particularly bed-bound or ambulatory, their probability of
contracting the infection should not differ. We checked the bed
movements (transfers) of the inpatients during the study period
and found that none of the inpatients with SARS were moved
to other beds after the onset of fever and, thus, could not have
played a role in the spread of the infection to other bays.
The SARS coronavirus could have been spread from the
index case patient to other inpatients indirectly through fomites
or HCWs as mechanical carriers. A similar pattern of noso-
comial infection has been reported for vancomycin-resistant
enterococci and Clostridium difficile, and contaminated hands
of HCWs were believed to be responsible for the contact spread
[12, 13]. However, nursing duties in our ward were assigned
by function and not by patient groups or geographical areas
in the ward, as commonly practiced in other places. Our in-
terviews confirmed that all nurses serving in the ward cared
for inpatients in all 4 bays during each shift. All physicians in
the ward also had to visit different inpatients in all 4 bays. The
HCWs could potentially spread the virus to other inpatients
through their unwashed hands after making contacts with the
index case. Because every nurse had a chance of contacting
different inpatients in the different bays, the risk of infection
should be distributed more evenly among the different bays. It
was still possible that some HCWs washed hands between ser-
vicing the next bay but did not wash hands between inpatients
in the same bay. This would contribute substantially to within-
bay spread but could not explain the relatively high attack rate
in the adjacent bay.
The sixth and tenth of March were the 2 important dates in
the multivariate analysis, with hazard ratios of 4.5 and 2.4,
respectively. These dates corresponded very well with the 2
peaks observed in the epidemic curve on 11 and 15 March,
suggesting a modal incubation period of ∼5 days from exposure
to fever onset, which was very similar to that of the largest
community outbreak in Amoy Gardens [6].
The epidemic curve for the distant bays started later, on 12
March, and peaked on 15 March, suggesting that there might
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Figure 5. Steady-state normalized concentration contours of virus-laden aerosols in the ward at a height of 1.1 m
be a secondary source of SARS in addition to the index case.
Stratified Cox regression analysis by bed location (results not
shown) revealed that presence on 6 March was the only sig-
nificant factor in the same and adjacent bays, whereas presence
on 10 March was significant in the distant bays.
The index case patient had symptom onset on 24 February,
and the virus load would be at its maximum around 6 March,
which was 10 days after onset of symptoms [14]. In fact, the
patient’s cough was most severe during 4–7 March, and his
condition deteriorated on 6 March; therefore, nebulizer use
was started in that afternoon and maintained until 12 March.
Clinical details of the index case have been described in 2 earlier
reports [8, 15]. The release of a large amount of virus into the
air by the index case patient through coughing around 6 March
probably caused the first wave of infections, which mainly af-
fected inpatients staying in the same and adjacent bays. Spread
by direct contacts and droplets could explain only a small num-
ber of the infections, because droplet spread is believed to be
effective only within a distance of ∼1 m. Airborne spread
through virus-laden aerosols was probably responsible for
spreading the infection to beds outside the same bay.
The epidemic curves of nurses, all staff (including nurses,
doctors, and other service workers), and visitors supported
point source infection (see figure 4). There was much overlap-
ping of the dates of onset of fever for all groups, including the
inpatients (figure 2), suggesting that the infections likely came
from a common source, at least in the first phase up to 12
March. Unfortunately, proper spatial analysis of SARS among
the non-inpatient groups was not possible. All HCWs visited
and worked in all bays during their routine work in the ward,
and all but 1 had direct contacts with the index case patient.
We did not have a register to provide reliable denominator data
for calculating the attack rates in the different locations for
visitors. However, quite a number of the infected visitors only
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visited inpatients staying in the adjacent bay and did not get
anywhere near the index case patient. A substantial number of
infected visitors experienced onset of fever earlier than did the
inpatients’ relatives who they visited and, thus, could not have
contracted the infection from them. This offers additional in-
direct support for a possible airborne spread of the virus from
the index case patient.
The second wave of infections could not be adequately ex-
plained by the spread from the index case patient alone. The
analysis of SARS among medical students suggested that the
index case patient became less infectious on 7 March [8]. Al-
though it was possible that he became more infectious again
around 10 March, this was not very likely, because his fever
and chest condition gradually improved starting on 9 March
[15]; other explanations should be considered. We have dis-
cussed above that bed movements of inpatients were unlikely
to be responsible for the spread. We noted that a number of
HCWs infected with SARS during the earlier phase of the out-
break developed fever and other symptoms on 8 and 9 March
but continued working in the ward until 10 March. One or
several of them most likely spread their infections to other
inpatients through direct contacts or droplets and caused the
second wave of the outbreak.
The analysis of the temporal-spatial spread of SARS from
the index case patient to other inpatients in the ward suggested
that airborne spread through virus-laden aerosols possibly
played an important role. Unlike other reports of airborne
outbreaks, we were unable to document the existence of the
infective agent in aerosols. Such documentation was simply
impossible in early March 2003, when the infective agent was
yet to be identified. SARS was unlikely a communicable disease
with obligate airborne transmission, such as tuberculosis, but
there was evidence to suggest that SARS could have at least
opportunistic airborne transmission under special circum-
stances when virus-laden aerosols could be generated [16]. The
virus-laden aerosols could come from the nebulizer [17] or the
nuclei resulting from the rapid evaporation of the droplets
produced by coughing in a relatively dry, air-conditioned en-
vironment. The use of the nebulizer appeared not to be essential
for the outbreak, because medical students who were present
in the ward only before the use of the nebulizer also became
infected [8]. Infected HCWs who continued to work after the
onset of symptoms were most likely responsible for propagating
the infection in the later phase of the outbreak.
The findings of this study have implications for future infec-
tion control inside hospitals. Any patients in whom any SARS-
like infection is suspected should be adequately isolated, or at
least segregated, to prevent the spread of infections. The bays in
a large ward should be adequately partitioned structurally and
provided with separate ventilation to reduce the mixing of air
between bays. Personal protective equipment for preventing con-
tact and airborne spread should be provided to HCWs, together
with a proper program of equipment testing, training, and main-
tenance. HCWs with infections or carrying infective agents
should refrain from working in areas or situations that favor the
transmission of infections from them to the patients.
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